Mohnish Pabrai's Q&A Session with MBA Students at Columbia Business School on March 18, 2021

Anuroop: Mohnish welcome to Applied Security Analysis. I think I mentioned to you, but it's a class of about 75 students and mix up first and second year at Columbia MBAs. Really appreciate you taking the time to speak to the students and joining us today. Really lucky to have you. I know all the students are really excited to have you here and listen to your thoughts and also see what questions you have for them as well. look, Mohnish really needs no introduction, but I will provide a brief background. He's the Founder and Managing Partner of Pabrai Investment Funds which he founded in 1999. Prior to that, he started his own consulting company: TransTech in about 1991, which I think was with under a hundred thousand savings and credit card bearings, which he turned around and sold for about 20 million in 2000.

He has entrepreneurial blood in him, which I believe has been a little bit of an inspiration from his father. He's one of the most well-known value investors of our time. He loves reading as you can totally tell from the reading list that he puts on his website and has a fascinating background. It should be a very fun and lively discussion today. He's written two books which I'd highly recommend all of you add to your bookshelves and reading list. One is The Dhandho Investor, which I believe, tell me if I'm wrong, is rewarding for endeavors to create wealth for something close to that I believe. The other is Mosaic. Then finally, he's also started the Dakshana Foundation that helps students in India train for their medical entrance exams. Before we begin Mohnish, I just also wanted to introduce you to my professor, Michael Herman. Mike, if you just quickly say – Hello!

Michael: I'm here. Hi Mohnish. Thank you so much for taking the time. Great to be here.

Anuroop: Great. Mohnish suggested we just go straight into Q&A and I guess his only request is that the students send no easy pitches his way, or I guess he'd like to call it only deadly curve ball. I hope you guys have some challenging questions for Mohnish today. I thought it's a great quote and we have about an hour so, you know, Mohnish thinking I could kick off, kick it off with a couple of questions and then we could turn it over to students. But before we begin, Mohnish, is there any sort of openings or anything you'd like to mention before we kick things off?

Mohnish: Yeah. I'm hoping that we can change the format a little bit on the roof. I hope you don't mind me messing with your well-planned agenda, but maybe I could ask the questions, we could switch it after you do a couple of questions. Could I ask some questions?

Anuroop: Okay.

Mohnish: Then we can go from there. I did so many webcasts where I get asked questions. I decided I want to ask some questions. Is that okay?

Anuroop: That's perfect. Why don't I kick off with one question and then we'll give you the floor if that works. I think I told Mohnish that this year's criteria for the pitch competition is 10 baggers over 10 years. I think it's very intriguing to hear some of these thoughts. But that sounds great. Look Mohnish, maybe you can just kick it off, would love maybe if you could just kick things off by describing your journey as a value investor. I think it's always really interesting to hear of people's stories and how they've evolved and, in particular, what got you into a value investing? What were some of the key points of evolution and your point in your career, in your sort of evolution as a value investor, and then sort of most recently how that tied into your, I think you recently talked about your focus on growing pies or spawners, as you've coined the phrase. How that transition has gotten you to 100X assert growing pies and spawners and what you like to call it.

Mohnish: Yeah. Anuroop it is also a pleasure and honor to be here. Colombia has a ground, the origins of value investing. I think all of you are in a wonderful place, probably the best institution on the planet for what subject we're discussing at hand. I think it's tremendous and I think is a tough program to get into, so congratulations to all of you and I'm sorry your experience at Columbia is somewhat mutilated by the virus, but hopefully it still works out okay. It's always fun to speak to Columbia students. I always enjoy that, I think in 94, before my kids were born, I was vacationing with my wife in London and on the way back we were flying from London to Chicago, and I was just looking for a book to read.

Mohnish: I picked up one of Peter Lynch's books I think one up on Wall Street. Until that point, I may have bought a stock or two here or there, but I really had no understanding of investing or even knew much about the industry or any of that. I read Peter's book on the flight, and I really enjoyed it. I said, wow, this is good stuff. He did so well. Then I looked up and I found a second book, I think Beating the Street and I read that book and I really enjoyed that, and I was ready to read another 50 Peter Lynch books. But I ran out of Peter lynch books. There were only two.

Mohnish: I still wanted to kind of pursue this area. In one of the books, he talked about this guy, Warren Buffett in very reverential terms. I had never heard about Buffett, and I looked him up and I was lucky. The first couple of biographies in Buffett had just come out a year or two before that Logan Stein and such, or

Hagan Strom and those and then the Berkshire letters and such, so that opened up a very big new world for me. It was exciting. That was just kind of like, I think drinking from a fire hydrant, I was just absorbing as much as I could. At that time, I didn't even know that there is such a thing as a Hedge Fund. I didn't know that the hedge fund industry even exists. I was aware that there was a mutual fund industry, and I was somewhat aware about how mutual funds functioned. When I read Buffett's approach to investing a couple of things struck me. One of the things that struck out is that what he was talking about is what I would call the laws of investing. These laws of investing from my point view, if you are like the laws of physics, it's like gravity works one way, you can't just say, I don't believe in gravity, and it stops working. It still works. I felt like these were like the Holy Grail. They were the laws of investing. But then when I looked at the mutual fund industry and I saw the kind of what they were doing, it was diametrically opposed to everything Buffett was talking about. Buffett was talking about concentrated portfolios. These guys had 200 stocks he's talking about, buy, hold and understand the business and all that. Mutual funds were like turning over half the portfolio every year. Everything seemed to be, and the mutual fund results reflected them not following the laws of investing. In 94, I had sold a portion of my business and after taxes and everything, I had a million dollars, the first time ever I had cash that I had no use for in my life. It was sitting around, and I said, nobody is following this guy Buffett. I bet if someone followed him, they would do really well because the whole world is doing something different. I said, why don't I take the million dollars I have and why don't I start to invest it in equities and figure out, because a lot of things Buffett was talking about, he talked about, I'm a better businessman because I'm an investor, I'm a better investor because I'm a businessman I could understand business. I felt like, because I could understand business. I looked at a publicly traded company. I felt like in many cases, or in some cases I could understand them and then I could figure out which ones to invest in and then use his frameworks. That worked really well. I mean, the million became like 13 million in five years and some dumb luck in there. I said to myself, Mohnish, I knew we could do this, and look, it works, just said to follow the rules and it works. That was how things got going. Then in 1999, about five years later, a bunch of friends asked me to set up a partnership, and then that eventually led to Pabrai Investment Funds and so on. That's how the journey got going. Then I think more recently last year, because I had so much time to contemplate my naval last year, because I wasn't on airplanes. It's always a good idea to contemplate your naval. That led me to Nick Sleep's letters. If you guys get a chance to know Nomad Investment Partnership, Nick Sleep's letters, you can ask God Google, he will take you there. I've known Nick's Sleep, he's been a friend of mine, I think almost since 20 years, but Nick himself went through an evolution. I was surprised when I read the letters in the way he had evolved. I realized that I was barking at the wrong tree. I was always in the mode mainly because I think markets were so euphoric in 1999, 2000, they were so overvalued. I went to more classic Graham, buying 50 cent dollar bills and selling them at 90 cents. I realized when I looked at what Nick was doing, that really the Holy Grail was to find long compounders and not to sweat it if the company is a little bit overvalued, basically using the same framework in owning a business as a founder does. That's a significant shift, but it makes life really easy because you don't really have to sweat the valuations so much. You don't need to put a fine exact number on it and so on. You're generally wanting to, as long as the business is not in secular decline, let them ride. Of course, there are tax efficiencies that come with that as well. That's a relatively new journey that I'm on and it's exciting. We'll see how it goes. That's sort of a bit of what's been going on.

Anuroop: Great. Maybe just my second one, and then I'll turn it over to you to ask the questions. But I would love to understand how you have in the down industry; you talk a lot about the concept of the head. I win tails. I don't lose a lot. In terms of margin of error, would love to just maybe delve into examples of how you thought about sort of margin of error because I think it's a really interesting concept. Then also in context of thinking about spawners or going businesses, I think if you give an example, they tend to be smaller and maybe a wider range of outcomes for these businesses. How do you sort of think about margin of error in context of the spawners and the businesses you're not focused on.

Mohnish: Yeah. Buffett says the focus really should be on the downside. You really have to make sure that the downside is very solidly protected. If the downside is well protected, almost the upside almost takes care of itself. When I wrote the Thunder Investor and I wrote about the Patels, I mean my own experience as an entrepreneur, and this is not just my experience, this is the experience of almost all non-venture back startups. Venture back startups make up maybe one 10th or 1% of all startups, maybe less than that non venture back startups is, what is everything that drives the US economy, the non-venture backs. People who start these businesses, everyone thinks they're risk-takers, but they're the opposite of risk-takers. Entrepreneurs do not take risks. They do everything in their power to minimize risk. They try to put the odds as much in their favor when they take these bets. So for example, in my own case, when I started my business, I pulled 30,000 for my 401k account. I was 24 years old. I wasn't worried about my retirement savings at that point. I took 70,000 in credit card debt and I researched bank personal bankruptcy laws at the time. They've changed those laws since then. But at that time, if you declared bankruptcy personal bankruptcy pretty much everything was cleansed. You couldn't declare bankruptcy again for seven years, which actually meant that you became a better credit for people to give you credit card and such because they knew you couldn't screw them again. They knew they got screwed once, but they knew they couldn't get screwed a second time for at least seven years. Your credit improved. The way I looked at it, I said, "okay, this hundred thousand that I'm putting in, let's say it blows up. Let's say the business fails, right? The 70,000 is Visa and MasterCard are my venture capitalists. They are just great venture capitalists. They took no board sheets. They never asked me what I'm doing. This was beautiful. If it didn't work, I could just go and declare personal bankruptcy and it'd be just wiped, clean. The 401k, I'd get a job and we'd rebuild that". I was single at the time. When I left my job, my boss told me, "We would love to have you back If you come back" They told me "When your business fails", they didn't say, "if your business fails". They told me "Mohnish, when your business fails, you can come back. We'll give you a 20% raise. We'll give you a promotion and you'll be all set. We'd be happy to have you back". I said, this is great. If the business fails, I declare bankruptcy, I go back to work, and I have a better pay. Where is the risk? This is how the brains of most early-stage entrepreneurs, which are non-venture backed work venture back guys, go to IV drip. They're in a different universe. Forget about that. IV drips are really bad for you because it's better to spend your time getting customers than trying to get some VC to fund you. I always see this better; this get customer. Anyway, what I'm trying to say is that most early-stage businesses and the entrepreneurs who start them do not take risks. They do everything in their power to minimize risk. Of course, what happened to me was the business never failed. I never went back to work. I paid Visa MasterCard off. They got very lucrative, interest terms. Everyone has, no problems. I think the same framework comes across in investing because just like an entrepreneur, you try to minimize downside risk. The same thing in investing is, you should always look at what happens if things don't go the way you're thinking, what's the protection, because capitalism is brutal. It's creative destruction. Most businesses that get started won't make it. Even if they make it, they won't go for 10 years or 20 years. By the time our business enters the S&B 500, it has already passed its product. The elements which will lead to its decline are mostly already in place. Very few businesses last 50 years, almost no businesses last a hundred years. It's pretty hard.

Anuroop: Great. Mohnish, I know the students, probably a ton of questions, but why don't we kick it off with the questions you have? At this time we can go some with the questions students have.

Mohnish: There are 25 teams in the class, which is great. We have the purging contest coming up in a couple of weeks. Most of you have your 10X and 10-year ideas already in your heads. You may not have your pitches ready, but you at least have the ideas. I'm desperate for those ideas. If you would please share with me the names of your ideas and maybe three sentences, like which you would give to an eight-year-old of why it's going to kick ass, and we're not going to post this video till at least May. This is just between us girls. Okay. Just purely between us, girls' conversation. Basically, whoever wants to go first, second, whatever I am ears.

Anuroop: All right. Well, we've been coaching them on the 60-second pitch. This might be a good time to put that into practice. If we have some brave volunteers. I guess if there's any brave volunteers that want to, we can just go, by the way, raise the hand feature and I can call them out. If there is anyone who wants to take a stab at it with their company of choice, we have got one volunteer Mohnish, Bill Ledley, and we are going to give you a 60-second pitch.

Bill: Yeah, thanks. Mohnish thanks so much for coming, we appreciate it. My team is Connor Flood and Joyce Sam. We're pitching Boyd group services they are a rollup auto collision and glass repair services. They have about 3% share of large market, good returns and strong balance sheet cash flow to continue rolling up

Mohnish: What's the name of the business? Again, I'm sorry I didn't get the name.

Bill: Boyd group services,

Mohnish: Boyd Group services. Okay.

Bill: It trades in on the Toronto exchange PYD, there is a checker.

Mohnish: Okay. What's the market cap?

Bill: It's about 5 billion in CAD. Sounds like four interchange US

Mohnish: Okay. Is it going to be 50 billion.

Bill: No. I think it can go probably to 20 billion over time.

Mohnish: All right. Pretty good. I'm appreciative of the idea. Were there any others that came close that you looked at and then discarded?

Bill: Yeah. We had a bunch of ideas kind of joined feel free heart, I think we looked at Wale for a while we looked at Snowflake, we looked at graph deck, which I think you own or owned at one point. Or guys, am I missing anything else? I guess not.

Mohnish: Okay. Well, I appreciate that, Bill. Thank you very much.

Mohnish: Yeah. Cheers. Anyone else?

Anuroop: Yeah, Dickson.

Dickson: Hi, Mohnish. Thank you so much for spending time with us. My team is working on NG. It was recently rendered to NG in corporate. It's the largest online marketplace for home services in the US, multiple the size of the closest competitors. It's undergoing a business model change from a traditional lead generation model to a fixed pre price model, which we believe will significantly increase the tech rate and improve the margins going forward and still a very under penetrated market right now. There's a lot of room for growth.

Mohnish: What's the market cap?

Dickson: Right now, is around 8 billion.

Mohnish: I'm sorry. 8 billion. Is it going to 80 billion?

Dickson: We think it's impossible within the next decade.

Mohnish: Okay. Were there any other ideas that came close?

Dickson: Not really, to be honest. Well, we didn't spend too much time on other ideas, and this is controlled by ISE. I should mention.

Mohnish: Oh, it's one of the ISE businesses,

Dickson: Correct. It's the main ISE business right now. They still own 84% of the business.

Mohnish: Okay. What's the picker again?

Dickson: A N G I

Mohnish: Oh, this is yeah, so it's ANGI's list. That's right.

Dickson: Okay. Get that own list. Yeah, yeah,

Mohnish: That's yeah, no I use Yelp services a lot, so I appreciate the business model.

Dickson: Okay.

Mohnish: That's great. Thank you. Next.

Anuroop: Two more volunteers, three more. Yes.

Chirag: Hi Mohnish. Our team is researching and working on Copart. Copart is an online B2B bidding platform for the car Salvage auction market. Basically, you have car sellers on the seller side, which are insurance companies and car fleet owners and used car dealers. On the buyer side, you have the whole sort of car rebuilds dismantlers and used car dealers and middle and in emerging markets. What we feel is that Copart is a differentiated business model and its superior execution skills, they've kind of enabled it to gain market share or do ballistic market. They kind of control almost 40, 45% of the market share in the US. The other second player is, is also around 40% of the market. We feel that Copart is well positioned to kind of further expand its market share and its core business segment, which is the insurance segment. Then also expand its presence in the non-insurance segment and kind of further strengthen its positioning in the international source markets of UK and Germany, which are the largest car markets outside of the US. Just like very quickly. Why we feel it's a high-quality business is because of its superior track record of capital allocation, average return on equity over around 30% plus fee cash flow margins of 10% has grown at almost 11% over the last six years in terms of top line and 26% in terms of the bottom line. We feel that at its current valuation, you are essentially getting the international business for free.

Mohnish: Did you read the biography of the book, what was the name of that book? I forget the name.

Chirag: From junk to gold.

Mohnish: Yeah. I really enjoyed that book. It's a very good book and I think it's a great business. In fact, one of my investors in one of my funds, a former investor now he's pretty high up in IT for them, very smart guy, actually in Texas and I actually looked at the business, but what's the current market cap?

Chirag: It's around 25 billion.

Mohnish: What do you think the market cap is in 10 years?

Chirag: Around 90 to 100 billion.

Mohnish: How are we getting to 250 billion? Mr. Ackman is not going to be happy with three or four X.

Chirag: This is according to base case. We're still building the best-case scenarios. I think this is a very conservative as like again, assuming all sorts of margins of safeties. At least in any case, you should make this much return and definitely to the best-case scenario, there are going to be a lot of other things that we need to underwrite, which we're still working on.

Mohnish: Yeah. Actually, one thing I really like is the core part of business. I think it's an exceptional business and also, they have one of the tailwinds they have is that these cars now have so many sensors in the bumpers and all that. Small beans lead to salvage. Yes. The car is five, six years old and this is a minor damage. It costs more than the car's worth. It's going in the direction of Copart. I think just in the book, the company has some very good principles. I really like it. Thank you for sharing that. Were there any other businesses that came close for you guys?

Chirag: I would request Sharan and Athena to share, because I think this one was from my side, but they had some interesting names as well. Sharan and Athena, if you want to share the picks that you had discussed,

Athena: We also looked at Viva the healthcare SAS system, but we felt like the market understands their growth pretty well. Tushar had a paper company that he had in mind, where was Tushar?

Tushar: Yeah. I was proposing to a packaging company. This did not seem as strong as Copart. We spent more time on Copart and we dropped that.

Mohnish: Okay thank you for sharing. Who is next?

Anuroop: Okay Mohnish we got two more billion pitchers and at the end I can send you the list of the 25. You have all 25 pitches. You'll inbox.

Mohnish: We'll do two more and then we'll go to questions. How's that?

Anuroop: All right. Oh yeah, no worries. We might have a couple more, we get four, just a couple more hands raised. Ok. We'll go to Frank and then we'll go to Noah.

Frank: Sure. Thanks for coming. This is Frank, and we're pitching a stock called Olli's the Ticker is OLI listed on Nasdaq. It's a 6 billion market cap company. It's a discount retailer. Basically, what it does is, it buys close out deals from bankruptcies or canceled orders, from Walmart, those kinds of things, they buy those at the significant discounts, and they put it in the store and sell it to customers at very significant discounts as well. The company currently has over three times 300 stores, it's seen very consistent 15% of taker in the store count over the past 10 years we think the moment is very good. It could easily grow to a thousand stores, maybe two thousand. We do see solid business here and white mode and we like the business.

Mohnish: What did you say the symbol was?

Frank: O L L I

Mohnish: Oh, Ollis bargain. I've never seen their stores around. Where are most of their stores located?

Frank: They're mostly in suburbs

Mohnish: Are they in California?

Frank: They're not in California. They are mostly still on the east side, east coast. Also they've recently expanded to Texas and we believe one day they'll reach the west coast. That's why there's a lot of white space.

Mohnish: Aare they doing clothing or what type of merchandise?

Frank: Not typically like basically the home good stuff, like the basic stuff, small electronics and I guess pretty odd range, but mostly necessities for your living, toilet paper and stuff like that.

Mohnish: Okay. Who would be their competitor?

Frank: There are a number of competitors. Like maybe you could say dollar stores, but like dollar stores, they will be not branded names. Steve will sell, like branded, merchandise, but as a significant discount. Like some of the competitors might be big loss if you've heard of it and Tuesday morning, those kinds of things, but they all have their own problems, but always seem very great.

Mohnish: One thing that's interesting to me is that I think I've written about in my first book I wrote about that funeral services is a great business. Ollis is in the funeral services business.

Frank: Funeral services?

Mohnish: Yeah. You may not have thought about it that way, but the thing is that, for example, if you look at TJ max, for example?

Frank: Uhhuh. Yeah, yeah. It's sort of like TJ Maxx.

Mohnish: Businesses that are either in recycling or funeral services are very good businesses. Ollis is, you might say it's recycling, maybe funeral services might be little.

Mark: Yeah. That's what makes sense.

Mohnish: But generally, those businesses have very strong characteristics because they have it's very compelling for a customer. The second thing is they may have a little bit of a Costco aspect to them in the sense that when you go into their stores different times when you go in there's different inventory. Yeah. There's a little bit of a bizarre type of situation. You get surprised, right? They might have some big inventory of big TVs come in or something. Yeah.

Frank: That's exactly what happens. They call it treasure hunt.

Mohnish: The treasure hunt, right? Those businesses can be pretty good, but also they have to execute and scale. One of the things about scaling is that unlike Costco, you got to keep feeding the machine. Like TJ max has to keep feeding the machine. That might get more difficult as things go on.

Frank: Oh yeah. But they have some particular buyers' team down and they're very good. We've just done cost with experts, there's more than enough than they could buy. Buying has been good going so far for all.

Mohnish: Well, thank you for sharing, Frank.

Frank: Thank you.

Mohnish: All right. Who's next?

Anuroop: We have three more and then we'll flip the question. We have Noah next, and then we'll go to Sagar.

Noah: Yeah. Hi Mohnish. Thanks for being here. My team is pitching Danimer Scientific, which is the only commercial manufacturer of Marine biodegradable plastic resin. Their products say, a chip bag would degrade in the ocean in 12 weeks without leaving any synthetic material behind. Wow. They're solving the massive plastics waste problem. They're sold out with take or pay contracts from blue chip customers through plan 2024 capacities. They're protected by significant R&D modes in a first mover advantage. We believe they can bill new facilities at over a 20% ROIC and use cheap project financing. The business currently trades at about a 4 billion market cap. We have a base case NOIC of eight times in 10 years.

Mohnish: Okay. Then what's the ticker symbol,

Dickson: DNMR.

Mohnish: DNMR. Did any other business come close or?

Noah: The nearest competitor is a company called RWDC and it was actually founded by the Dan in Danimer. He left about six years ago. Clearly a lot of the IP here sits in his brain, but these guys are barely scratching the service on the addressable market.

Mohnish: Okay. Thank you for sharing. Next.

Sagar: This is Sagar. Kedar, Neil and I are pitching group, ticker VRM. Vroom is a 5 billion market cap, 1.3 billion revenue used car ecommerce platform in United States. The company went public recently in June 2020, and is trading at a relatively cheaper consumer tech, multiple of 1.7X, a price better. The company represents a great opportunity where it is trying to streamline and nationalize the used car inventory marketplace model. Currently the US used car marketplace is an 800 billion industry, which is highly fragmented filled up with largely mom and pop stores. Vroom is trying to consolidate the market. Currently online ecommerce players should present only 0.5% of the world market. As this post COVID inflection where consumers are becoming more adapted by new cars, online kicks in this ecommerce is expected to go up as high as 50% in best case. In base case maybe 20 to 30%, we believe that Vroom could sell potentially more than a million cars by 2032. With an RPU of close to 20,000 US dollars. It represents 10 X in 10 years.

Mohnish: Do they compete with Carvana?

Sagar: They do. They do have different models. Carvana does like a traditional used car model where it goes region by region versus Vroom, which is trying to truly bring the ecommerce efficiencies by going national and then re-distributing its inventory basis data observed in each market.

Mohnish: Okay and why has the stock behaved differently on Carvana?

Sagar: Recently Vroom has been relatively more risky hours. During COVID it bought down its inventory from up to 8,000 cars that it had in June 2020, the IPO to almost 2000 cars, because it couldn't predict how quick the market would rebound. Unfortunately for them, the market rebounded quite positively, and they were left with lower inventory, lower number of online posting of cars. That's why their sales kind of took a dip compared to what the analysts were projecting and that made the market a bit apprehensive.

Mohnish: Okay. Well thank you for sharing. Anyone else Anuroop, or are we done?

Anuroop: Let’s do one more Mohnish. Maria, do you want to finish us off on the pitches?

Maria: Sounds good honor. Mohnish, thanks so much for being here. I'm on a team with Maggie and Danielle in this class, we're pitching a company called Pager Duty, which trades under the ticker PD, and currently has a 3 billion market cap. PagerDuty provides incident management response solutions to customers across a variety of industries. For example, if you're an online retailer and your website goes down, PagerDuty is going to alert the correct members of your IT teams and help provide intelligence to both troubleshoot and prevent that sort of problem from occurring in the future. We believe that PagerDuty has a first mover advantage in this space and is going benefit from the tailwind of the increasing importance of the virtual and digital space for customers generating a larger and larger share of their revenues over time.

Mohnish: Okay. What are the revenues of the company?

Maria: Sure. Maggie and Danielle, I believe, and I have worked on the model. The company has experienced a pretty significant revenue cake over the past five years to about 40 million. Pretty significant growth in the past five years to, I believe, about 200 million today.

Mohnish: Okay. Thank you for sharing.

Maria: Thank you very much.

Mohnish: One question I had Anuroop is that I didn’t hear any pitches that were less than a hundred million or less than two or 300 million. Was there a minimum market cap in the contest, or no?

Anuroop: Yeah. The minimum market cap, to your point, I think it was a billion dollars, so that was a criteria sort of a billion-dollar market cap north America listed with two criteria with next potential was 10 years.

Mohnish: Both rules took away all the fun.

Anuroop: Maybe to potentially source those funds, we need a minimum size for the business, but no, the 10 has become easier if you can go sub billion, for sure.

Mohnish: Yeah. I was just wondering, that's harder as you get into the billions. The picking becomes slimmer, but on the other hand, you pick some 5 billion market cap may not be fair and may trade by appointment so that might be an issue but no, it's wonderful to hear the pitches. Of course, one of the issues I go through as an investor is, the first thing that goes through my head is, is this within the circle of competence, right? It's the first thing I'm processing and probably 99% of the stuff is outside my circle of competence. A lot of the pitches are just straight over my head, they weigh past my pay grade. They become hard until I spend more time and try to figure them out. But it's great to see the diversity, there's a wide range of businesses. I think the purging contest is cool because it just drives things in a very practical way. That's wonderful. Would you like to switch back to me answering questions?

Anuroop: I mean open-ended, but if that works, we can switch it.

Mohnish: Let's go with what you guys have on your mind. Sure.

Anuroop: Whoever has a question, just raise your hand and then we'll just go for as that from before or did you have a question to off.

Maria: That's before, but I can kick us off as well. Mohnish, I was curious been reading a lot about your different definitions. One that was particularly interesting to me was the idea of the Uber cannibals and that kind of constant rebalancing every year, looking at Uber cannibals was curious to what led you to develop that newer definition and what you think of the prospect of that in the medium to long term.

Mohnish: Yeah, I think the cannibals is a term coined by Charlie as it relates to buybacks and such, and Uber, I borrowed from the ride sharing company as an out prefix but basically the idea is that if a business has a lot of stability in its operations where there's going to be some sort of high probability of continued prosperity and cash flows. It's not ridiculously priced, it can be a really good use of capital and we've seen some examples I think a good two good examples are NVR and AutoZone. NVR, 25 years or something, has bought back 80% of their shares and their business hasn't grown much, but the stock has gone up, I think more than 400-fold in the last 25 years. It's a home builder, it's not some tech company or something like that, but they're very capital light, and they're pretty much in, they have religion where they take a hundred percent of net income and sometimes more than a hundred percent of net income and dump it all into buybacks. They also don't try to time the market or try to figure out the stock price too low or too high or whatever. They just autopilot buying back shares. It's worked out very well for them and their shareholders and the same with AutoZone, it's, it's an okay business. But I think the buybacks have really contributed. I think that if certain businesses or certain characteristics sign on for these types of programs and they go long-term, one of the things I learned in terms of the Uber cannibal is rebalancing every year is an idea. We want to find the future NBRs and you really kind of get a hockey stick at some point where you just keep buying back the shares. Then at some point the multiple takes off and everything takes off. It can be really good if you can identify the company DNA that buys into that and is going down that path. It could be really good.

Anuroop: Great. Next, we'll go to Dickson.

Dickson: Thank you, professor. Hi Mohnish, it’s me again. I have a question. Now you mentioned that you were more focused on the downside as an investor, but I think you admitted also in the recent podcast you did with Professor Santos that you have a tendency to go into situations where the outcome could be binary because of high leverage and maybe turnaround situation. Can you just maybe share with us why it is so, and how are you navigating away from them? For example, did experience with horse head, for instance, and with those experience, how do you think about averaging down right now?

Mohnish: Well, I never deliberately situations that are binary outcomes. I mean, those are not appealing to me. Sometimes I end up in situations where eventually it becomes a binary outcome, or it's gone south. That's a different situation, but I do try hard at the outset before the investment is made to try to figure out what could go wrong. If those things go wrong, what could happen to our investment results with the position? We try to not go into situations where investing is probability. I think any business has a probability of zero. It could be very small, but it's not non-existent. Every business has uncertainty in the future and could have serious difficulties in the future, which may not be predictable. We can't just say that something is an absolute investment in the game of probabilities. What we do want is to try to maximize the probability of a good home run and minimize the probabilities that we have a permanent loss of cap. If things don't work and I end up with approximately what I started with, that's a great outcome. I would take that bet all day long. If things do work, then I get a multi bagger. If that's the kind of equation I'm looking at, that equation is very attractive. If the equation is that there is a significant probability of a zero, coupled with a very high probability of a multi bagger that is not of that much of interest. We definitely want to have downside predictions. Sometimes we end up with the situation, I mean all said in the example, at the time the investment was made it was not a risky investment. What ended up happening is that they were trying to build a new plant which continuously checked getting delayed and had cost overruns. In the meantime, they shut down their old plant and, in the end, they ran out of the runway. The zinc prices collapsed, and all their finances went upside down. It's definitely within a bell curve of probability but I did not expect it to go to that extreme end of a bell curve. One other thing that I learned from the experience is that we just cannot assume that when management embark on these ambitious new plants and things, they will go as planned. You have to put in a lot large and safety. I have another investment right now for example, a company in India called Rain industries which is again building some new plants and such, and they've had some cost overruns and some delays, but it has not impacted the business because the size of those investments relative to the mothership is well understood. Even if those plants were zero in that plan, for example, the business would not get affected, the business would still survive and thrive. That was missing in the horse head situation. What if this doesn't work at all. We live and learn and so that was a good learning that came out of that.

Dickson: Thank you.

Anuroop: Great. The next up, we'll go to Joseph Kal Zang

Joseph: Thank you, professor. Thank you, Mohnish. I'm from the same team as Frank, which is Olli's team. I think you just mentioned that Olli's business model is kind of like a funeral service. I really didn't gather those points, could you elaborate on this common bit more?

Mohnish: Yeah. For example, let's say some manufacturer has a million, too many flat screens they made. They need to get rid of that. Ollies is the burial ground for those TVs. They're going to give those TVs an honorable burial and actually not really a burial, they're going to give them an honorable recycling. Basically, the thing is that everything that is living and breathing today will die, right? All kinds of manufacturers will always have issues with too much inventory or unwanted inventory. Costco just returned a huge bunch of stuff and so on. The need to recycle and find those somewhat damaged goods in a new home is a continuous need. Just let me take a step back. My book, the first book, which talked about funeral services is out of print. But if you go on my blog ChaiwithPabrai, all the chapters are there as PDFs. They're a chapter of the funeral business. If you look at the traditional funeral services business, they're really good businesses because number one, none of you will tell me that after Columbia business school, I'm going to run a funeral home. That is not what you aspire to do. Most 20 somethings don't say I'm going to be Tycoon of funeral homes. People don't aspire to enter the business. The second is that when your grandmother dies and you're looking for funeral services, I hope you don't take the low bid. You don't call 10 places. Now. She may not have been that great a person, but even then, you won't call 10 places and find the cheapest place. I hope you won't do that. You're typically going to try to go to a place that your family has used in the past. There's some kind of connection that is got, and you typically don't negotiate bottom of the barrel services. If they tell you, would you like flowers at the service? You're not going to say no. Generally speaking, the business when they're selling their service, they don't have pricing pressure. Okay. The second thing is, I don't know who's going to die in Peoria in 2022, but I know how many are going to die in Peoria, Illinois in 2022. There's a recurring revenue to funeral services, which is beautiful. All of these things actually make models like TJ Maxx, really good models because some examples of either sort of recycling slash funeral services, businesses are eBay. For example, eBay is recycling and funeral services, great business. TJ max is a great business, and you can just go down the list. All their competitors, big lots. All these guys are great businesses because these mismatched inventories need a home. I mean, like I have an investment in Seritage. They are converting Sears into other things. One of their tenants is TJ Maxx, no issues with the business, very strong financials, great tenant because of the underlying nature of the business. Retail is a terrible business, but within retail, recycling and funeral is a great business, so it's a good area to look at.

Anuroop: Thank you so much.

Mohnish: Okay.

Anuroop: That's really interesting way to think about it. We'll jump over to now.

Nao: Yeah. Hi, Mohnish thank you for coming and talking with us today. I first got to know you five or six years ago when I was reading Guys Spier's book, the education of Value Investor and you and Guy joined to a ticket to have lunch with Buffett. Right. So I'm curious to ask, how was your experience, how is your relationship with Guy today, and in general, how do you get along with other investors?

Mohnish: My relationship with Guy is awesome. In fact, this morning he called me, and then he was showing me he's hanging out in Klosters in Switzerland, which is near Davos. He just bought a home there and he was just showing me the view, which is spectacular. The lunch with Buffett was really good. When I told my wife that I wanted to bid for this lunch, she has seen a lot of quirks in me over the years and she just thought it was just another stupid quirk. She said whatever. Then after lunch, and since then, she said that "other than marrying me, it was the best thing you ever did". I did not have this plan, but that lunch is continuing to pay dividends endlessly. Okay. It's actually tremendous because one of the things that happened at the lunch is, I told Warren at the lunch, I said, "look Warren, my wife Harina is a great fan of yours, but her true love in life is Charlie". Buffett is very competitive. He tells her, "Listen, Charlie's just this old fart. He's very boring. I am the guy who is interesting. Not him. Now to prove to you that I'm the real thing, and Charlie's useless. I'm going to set you guys to lunch with Charlie". Now you can bribe Warren and have lunch with him, but there's no such bribing mechanism with Charlie. I just thought Warren was kind of joking. Then three days after lunch, I got an email from Buffett's assistant going to Munger's assistant saying, "Hey I met these guys in California, wonderful couple blah, blah, blah. They seem to have the misconception, Charlie, that you are more interesting than me. Of course, they're wrong, but I've told them to meet you for lunch. Then they'll have their head screwed on straight after that". Then we had lunch with Charlie. It was like, buy one, get one free. It was great. Of course, I ended up enjoying the Charlie lunch a lot more than the Buffett lunch. Charlie is unplugged, he is always unplugged. He's doing going. If you think he's unplugged in the daily journal meetings or the Berkshire meetings, you have not seen him. One-on-one is completely unplugged. Like he would say something, and I would just turn and say, did God just use that word? Did God just say that? Yes, I think. Then while I'm thinking about that, God say that word again. It's funny, but anyway, what ended up happening is Charlie and I ended up becoming friends. I played a lot of bridge with him and his friends at the LA country club, which was a lot of fun because Rick Guerin passed away, but Rick Goran and Charlie, and a couple of other guys used to come for bridge. We used to meet for lunch before the bridge game. I'd be sitting there and there'd be Charlie and Rick in front of me. I'm like pinching myself saying, is this real what's going on? Then I would ask them all these questions about the sixties and the Western Pacific stock exchange and all these things that they were doing and all these different stories they had, it was just hilarious stories. The thing is that that lunch has led to probably several dinners a year with Charlie in his home, a lot of bridge games. Then on the Warren side, that friendship also continues, I got to know Warren's assistant really well because we were setting up the lunch and all that. Debbie's wonderful. Guy and I told Debbie, "Listen can we take you to lunch?" She said, "look, if you come to Omaha on Thursday, when the meetings on Saturday, because Friday is crazy, Thursday, we can go for lunch. For several years, Guy and I used to show up in Omaha on Thursday, then we'd go to lunch with Debbie. The lunch with Debbie or the lunches with Debbie were 10 X, better than the lunch with Warren. Because I would get, I would say, all these stories, for example, the Wall Street journal usually is printed very early. I think by 2:00 AM or 3:00 AM it's printed, and Warren had figured out some way of getting the paper, not at 7:00 AM, but like, if you were up late, you would get it almost the night before. Just the way I got a lot of details and like I used to ask Debbie, this was like, going back maybe 10 years, I'd say, "Debbie, does he have a mobile phone?" She starts laughing, she says "he has a mobile phone. It's usually sitting in my desk. When he goes out of town, I charge it and I give it to him. The only thing he knows how to do with it is to call me okay. Anytime he has to use it, he calls me and says, have such and such guy call me. Then he knows how to answer the phone". That was it. That was the extent. Charlie has never used a mobile phone in his life. Some of the biggest Apple shareholders and that's the situation with mobile phones. But anyway, I got a lot of interesting data about how Warren functions. Of course, I met him many more times, and one time he gave Guy and me a tour of his galactic headquarters and like, he took us to a Coke machine. He says, "this is my Coke fountain". Then he pours it into a Coke. Anyway, what I would just say is that I just wanted to have lunch with him to thank him. I had no ulterior motive other than to just be able to thank him. But, what ended up happening was just all this other stuff. There's a meeting on Sunday in Omaha for all the Berkshire managers and the board members and all that. Warren invites Guy and me to that Sunday brunch. Every year, Guy and I think that this is it, we're not going to get any more invitations. We've been getting invitations like 10 years, because sometimes we'd be at that brunch. I'm sitting with Guy and right behind us, Bill Gates and Bono are talking to each other. It is just all these surreal things going on, or that NFL player with a long first name and last name, Sue Ndamukong, whatever his name is, I can't even pronounce it. He'd be hanging out. He's like the gentlest creature, I look at him and say, "you could never harm anyone". He said, "yeah, that's how I am normally, except on Sundays". Anyway, has just been wonderful and it continues, that lunch took place I think 13 years ago, but it continues. It's been great, wonderful. Nothing to regret.

Nao: Yeah. Amazing. Thanks for your exciting story. Thank you.

Mohnish: Anuroop we've gone past time, but I have no pressing engagements so we can go as long as you guys want to go.

Anuroop: Okay. Why don't you want to start off? Perfect. I want to say, we go at about 5:30. Does that work for you, Mohnish?

Mohnish: Yeah, that sounds good.

Anuroop: I guess, 5:30 Eastern. Probably 2:30 your time. But no, those are interesting stories. I'm sure it'd be great to reapply the wall, particularly to hear about Charlie unfiltered, which I guess most people think is unfiltered even in the public audience. I guess next we'll go to Chirag whom I think you may have heard from him already in one of the pitches.

Chirag: Yeah. Hi Mohnish. That was a very fun conversation. I'm not sure I should be asking this theoretical question now, but my question is more around the margin of safety and that's a term that's widely used across the investor community, right? Different investors kind of have a very different thought process around it. Like for some, it's more about being able to buy at a good discount to their belief of intrinsic value, for some it's about buying a high-quality business, even if that's a fair price. Cause for them, the safety net is around the quality and the quality of the management team. Even on the valuation side, some want to apply conservatism across all parameters, be valuation, be projections, be the market opportunity, whereas some want to get the business center market more accurately and want to just use this lever on the valuation side. Just wanted to get your perspective and your experience and during your evolution as an investor, which of these levers do you kind of spend more time on or prioritize and which levers you don't care much about and try not getting caught up in that analysis cycle.

Mohnish: Yeah. I think that if you look at Ben Graham and all of what he was talking about, he relied on hard asset downside protection, right? Part of the reason he relied on hard asset downside protection is that he came out of all the turmoil of the great depression and all that, the 1930s with the stock prices and doing what they were doing. He saw all the decimation of wealth that took place at that time. In many ways, you could say that Ben was scared by that experience. Security analysis that came out from that experience was very much, we are going to invest in a place where no matter what happens, we cannot lose money. The problem with that approach is it also crimps your upside. If you buy some crappy business that is trading at one third of liquidation value, probably doesn't have much upside either. That's the nature of the beast, right? Warren actually evolved from there. The big evolution for them came when they saw what happened with See’s candy, right? Because he paid more than 25 million for book value, less than 5 million, right. He was paying several times book value, which to him, was a big step in a different direction, but the See’s investment led them to make the Coca-Cola investment. When they made the Coca-Cola investment, again, it was the same thing. The downside protection was not hard assets. The downside protection was the brand and all the embedded memories, we all have of Coke deep in our psyche. Even when he made the investment in Apple, the downside was not in the hard assets. It was in the brand value and what link customers had to that company. The other thing Munger pointed out is that when Graham always focused on all these net deaths and downside protection, he made all his money on Geico He made money on Geico, not because he bought it cheap, he made money because it was a great business. When we look at the margin of safety, I think we have to be a little more flexible because typically you're not going to get all of the above. You do not get downside protection in terms of hard assets, where in even worst-case times you'll come out ahead. At the same time having a hundred bags of the two generally will not go hand in hand. It may happen occasionally, but it'll typically not happen all the time. I think we need to look at downside protection. We need to be comfortable that the downside may not be protected purely with hot assets. We may even go to the point of saying that if things don't work out, we may have a problem, but the odds of that are really low. When you look at businesses, like you look at Copart or any of these other kinds of businesses, you can't really get to downside protected hard assets, but a combination of the culture and the values, what the reputation means in customer's minds, the links with the insurance companies and the links with their all the other ecosystem that's, what's giving you the protection. You need to get comfortable with that.

Chirag: Got it. That's helpful. Thanks for sharing that.

Mohnish: Sure.

Sean: Yeah. Can you elaborate on your thought process, when you are thinking that it was okay to break your phone. Just because you had to pay, obviously were you already thinking that the PR is high, you are thinking that you would generate the 25% of that PR rate and second question is, the question popped up as you were talking about the brands, but like, Twinkie brand was obviously strong brand, but that company went bankrupt. I would just love to know what has made that more of an exception and like what characteristics that enabled that.

Mohnish: Well, so first, about the 401k and the credit card. At the time I was 24 years old, I was single. As far as I knew, I had no kids. The thing is that there I knew I had one clear shot where I could completely fail, and nobody really would get affected. My biggest asset was my future earning potential, which was not being mortgaged. I knew that I could always get another job. I had a long runway that I could work for a company or whatever else and get paid well. What I was putting at risk was really not the hundred thousand I borrowed, because the 70,000 could get written off with bankruptcy and so on. It was really 30,000. My take was, if it goes away, it's not the end of the world because I can restart and get back those go savings and so on. I didn't really care, but what I could see on the other side was that I would have at least felt that I gave it a solid shot, right. If I just stayed in corporate America and just didn't do that, then I would always be wondering, and as I got older, or if I had married and had kids and all that, the equation changes, everything changes then, because then, the risk factors become higher. I used to, at that time, have a subway sandwich for lunch and a subway sandwich for dinner. My lunch and dinner together were $7. Okay. I had no expenses; things were pretty, and I was very happy having a subway sandwich for lunch and dinner because I was so excited about the work that I was doing and the things I was trying to build and all of that. I realized the interest rate was high and I realized the 401k, I bit penalty and all that, but I just said, you got to do what you can do with what resources you have. I didn't see much risk in just blowing those up. That's why I went for

Anuroop: I think you talk about it in the book, but I think people tend to compute risk and uncertainty a lot and it's a very common thing people confuse in investing. I think it's such an important distinction, but it's one that a lot of people could interpret.

Mohnish: The other question on brands or 99 of businesses are not going to get to the promised land. Capitalism is very brutal, if we just went through the list of companies that you guys gave me and we just, 10 years from now, looked at that list. One of the things that will be there in that list would be a high mortality rate. Not just that they didn't get to five X, that they're not even where they are today. They've gone backwards. Of course, I don't know which ones, we wish we knew which ones. I think that capitalism is very brutal just because you have a great brand doesn't mean you're going to get there. A lot of great brands perish, brands need a lot of care and attention and nurturing to get to where they are or where they should be. If they go through neglect, even for a short period of time, it can have a very detrimental impact. Businesses are very fragile creations and that's what we want to try and do. We want to look for an exceptional business that is not so fragile. Then once you find the not so fragile business, then you are also going to find them at a cheaper price and all these other pieces. I think when you put it all together, this is why investing is not so easy.

Sean: No, I was asking the first question because I also don't have much money and I really want to invest. I was really thinking about breaking my 4and1k as well as, getting that credit card.

Mohnish: Well, I would say that the Columbia alum Li Lu should be your role model. Li Lu came from China, Penniless. He did three degrees in Columbia at the same time. He was on student loans and the float of the student loan, which is from the time they gave him the loan to the time he had to pay the money. He used that float period to invest the money. When Li Lu graduated, he had over a million dollars. In some cases, I think he bought some Russian assets as like one 10th of 1% of, I mean, P of 0.1 of P or 0.5 or something. He made some crazy investments and he got there. In my opinion, that sounds a lot riskier than what I did, but maybe in Li Lu's mind, it wasn't so risky because he may have understood those bets a lot better than I do. I think that your situation of not having much money is a very common situation for a lot of entrepreneurs and a lot of people. You really need to substitute money for what's between your years. Especially in this economy, there are lots and lots of entrepreneur opportunities where money is not required.

Sean: That game stopped.

Anuroop: One more fun fact about the case competition is there's a cash prize. That's donated by way above 150,000 for the top two winners. Generally, it's encouraged to put some of that money into a charitable Foundation. Part of it's just to get people to start thinking about that at an early age. I know you so maybe it's a two for one special, but I know you've started the Dakshana Foundation. Maybe we can nudge people to consider that and would love to just maybe spend a couple of minutes and what prompted you to start that. I think it's a very personal thing, but your approach or your framework of philanthropy.

Mohnish: Yeah. I think it was Buffett who said that “even if you are a slightly above average investor, if you spend less than you earn over a lifetime, you cannot help, but get extremely wealthy”. It's just natural, it's the runway and compounding and all of those things. Basically, we are in a very blessed situation, and I think almost everyone in this room is going to end up with more wealth and assets than they can use, which is wonderful. In my case, once I could see that we were getting there, we were even gone past that point. There were a couple of things that struck me, one is that there are only two things you can do once you have more wealth than you can use. First, the ability to use wealth beyond a certain number, which would increase happiness is very hard to do. There are very few things that you could buy that cost a lot of money, which would increase happiness. I'll just give you an example. I think that if I owned a second home would reduce happiness I mean, some remote real estate somewhere and some pipes burst or some crazy maintenance issues, whatever, I don't need to deal with that. Right. Most things that you would think of spending money on is not going to help you and the best things in life are free. It doesn't translate. The bottom line is that I could see in 2005-2006, that we were on a trajectory where already there was substantial wealth it was going to keep growing and there was no way to use it really. There are only two choices when you have more than you need, you can either give it to your gene pool, or you can recycle back to society. Those are only two choices you have and giving it to your gene pool is a disservice to them because the fun is the journey. The fun is having limited resources and carving your own path and figuring it all out. I think Buffett says that if you're Jesse Owen’s son, you're not really going to be helped by starting hundred-yard dashes at the 40-yard line, you're not going to become the greatest sprinter doing that. It's okay if you get to start a hundred-yard dash at the three-yard line of the five-yard line, but not at the 40 yard line. He says, “give your kids enough money for them to do enough, for them to do whatever they want, but not enough for them to do nothing”. Right? Once it was very clear to me that a large inheritance was kind of stupid. Then you're only down to recycling to society. I'm a competitive guy, I'm a numbers guy. I like to win. I was really disappointed in the way charities functioned. I always looked at charities and I saw that they would hold a fundraiser or whatever. 60% of the money went to raise the funds. Then the other thing I'd see is they'd have 10 initiatives and there was no measurement of which initiative did well. Just like investing, I felt like I could do it better. I said, you know what? Once I got to 50 million, I said, we'd give away 2% of wealth every year. We can give us what a million. I said, I want to do it in a manner where, which is like investing, where we look at high returns on invested capital in this case, it's high social returns on invest capital. One of the key decisions that Dakshana made so most charitable initiatives, which are very good initiatives to put money into, do not lend themselves to easy measurement. Most charitable initiatives do not lend themselves to easy measurement. I mean, if you were donating clean needles to heroin addicts, for example, in some inner city somewhere, it becomes difficult to measure. It's probably doing a lot of good, but what would happen if we changed it this way or that way, or whatever, is these things become just hard to measure. What I did is I inverted the problem. I said that I'm only looking at initiatives where measurement is. I just looked at all the different charitable initiatives and I just threw away everything which would make measurement hard. I went for the ones that were easy. Then we ended up with this model where we train kids for the IITs and med school, because for them to get to those institutions, there's an independent third party the tests. We don't have control over the test or the results, but we can look at that outcome and know how effective we were. It is highly effective because every year when our kids take these tests and they go to IITs, and all that, we get to see what we did right and wrong. If our numbers drop, we then go back and fix it. We are continuously improving and changing and tweaking how we do things. That's only possible because we have a feedback loop giving us data. In capitalism there's a natural feedback loop, which is your profitability. If your business doesn't make money, you are gone. But in charitable giving, if I'm the Rockefeller Foundation and I have a billion dollars and I give away 5% a year, I will never earn out of money because probably the investment returns are more than 5%. But even if they drop, it'll be 5% of what relapse. You'll never add of money. You could every year do useless things and there's no feedback loop and you would never really pay a penalty. Just so the penalty we pay in capitalism for being stupid just don't exist on the non-profit side. Some of the parts that led to Dakshana actually worked out way better than I thought a and they do all the work and I take all the bows and everyone's happy with that, so it's great.

Anuroop: Yeah. It's a very interesting approach and you don't commonly see the business approach applied to philanthropy. I think that combination's interesting and probably gets more impact for the dollar. It will be a good plug for the winners to consider the Dakshana Foundation about it. It's a great cause. I know maybe should get close to 5:30 here. Maybe just two quick ones to wrap up. One, just for fun. I know you have a massive bookshelf behind you. You have a very good leading list on your website. Is there any sort of two or three favorite books that you have for classes evening, a week? Well, The Dhandho Investor is number one.

Mohnish: This is my most recent book. I'm reading these things that I can apply in my life with this book. There's the TV anchor on CNN, Sanjay Gupta. This is his brother who wrote the book, Sunil Gupta and he's very self-deprecating and great writing style and actually has some many good things to say. If you were a startups trying to raise money, or if you were a hedge fund trying to raise money, or if you were a company trying to get customers, any of those things, I think you can apply his stuff in so many different ways. I'm really enjoying this book. The other book that is coming out on April 20th, which may be even better than this book is called Richer, Wiser, and Happier. It's by a guy named William Green. There are two particular chapters that are my favorites in that book. One is the chapter on Nick and Zach, of the Nomad partnership, Nick sleep and case the career. There's a chapter on Nick and Zach, which is exceptional and the other chapter is on me. I'm not sure which chapter is better, but you can decide. But I think those are the two chapters you got to read in that book, I'm the opening bats. It starts with me, which is why I love the book so much, but anyway, I think Backable is a great book, but even if I was not in the book, I would still recommend it because Zach are so good, but William Green is a very gifted writer. I don't know how many hundreds of hours I had to spend with him and how many nights on Indian trains, we were together, but we spent a lot of time together. He did that with all the people he interviewed and stuff. He just did a great job. I think that book is going to become something of a classic because this is just the way he's done it. He's got a chapter on Howard Marks. He's got a chapter on a bunch of who's in investing. It's good. Those are the two I would recommend. Just one other thing I would just say is that we were talking about the business approach of philanthropy. When you do philanthropy, it's a mix of heart and head. You have to combine heart and head. The problem with most charities is they have huge hearts and no heads, and that doesn't work. These are great people, wonderful people to hang out with, but useless at running charities. You also can be the other end. You can be all head and no heart. It's really a combination. You have to have a big heart, but you definitely need horsepower coupled with that heart. I hope you enjoy that, but I really enjoyed this session. Thanks for letting me ask you some questions and send me all 25 of the picks. That'd be great.

Anuroop: We will Mohnish. On behalf of the class, really appreciate you taking the time, thanks for both investing and you, this is interesting for everyone here. We appreciate the extra 30 minutes. This is a lot of fun.

Mohnish: Alright thank you.